(EnergyAsia, February 18, Monday) --- Exxon Mobil Corporation said its technology has resulted in another world record-setting well at the Sakhalin-1 oil project in eastern Russia, enabling the production of more energy while reducing the impact on the environment.

(EnergyAsia, February 18, Monday) --- “Deepwater Development Asia 2008” will be held at the Prince Hotel & Residence in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia from March 24 to 26.
As oil wells in Asia continue to deplete, more companies are beginning to realise the potential of deepwater fields. Deepwater development is now strategically important for most global offshore operators as easily accessible offshore hydrocarbon deposits have been discovered and mined for the last five decades.

(EnergyAsia, February 15, Friday) --- Canada’s Hanwei Energy Services Corp said it has been licensed by Aerodyn Energiesysteme GmbH, a leading international wind power engineering firm, to produce two versions of its aeroBlade 1.5 wind turbine blades in China.

Hanwei will be provided with the moulds, technical know-how, specifications, and support to produce the 37.5 meter and 40.3 meter versions of the 1.5 megawatt (MW) blades to be sold in China under the Hanwei brand.

(EnergyAsia, February 15, Friday) --- The 13th ‘Annual Asia Upstream 2008’ conference will be held at the Orchard Hotel in Singapore from February 28 to 29.

The conference will review diverse upstream ventures, acreage opportunities, the strategies of the super-majors, independents, national oil companies and governments, investment opportunities, oil and energy finance, and the role of the service and supply industry.

The event’s speakers include Bertrand Huillard (Total), Agung B. Indriyo (PT Medco Energi), Michael Jamieson (BHP Petroleum), Peter Grant (Woodside Energy), Duncan Clarke (Global Pacific & Partners), Sukusen Soemarinda (Pertamina),  D.K. Pande (ONGC), Adauto Carneiro Pereira (Petrobras), V.K. Sibal (Directorate General Hydrocarbons India), Sujata Venkatraman (GX Technology), Suwit Pitrchart (PTTEP),

By George Friedman of Stratfor

(EnergyAsia, February 14, Thursday) --- Tehran has announced that Iran and the US will hold a new round of talks on the future of Iraq at some point next week. The Iranians said the “structure of the discussions have been finalized but the level of participation has not yet been agreed.”

Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is expected to visit Iraq before March 20, the Iranian New Year. The US has not denied either of these reports. There thus appears to be some public movement occurring in the US-Iranian talks over Iraq.

If this visit took place, it would represent a substantial evolution. It also is not something that would happen unopposed if the US did not want it to; by contrast, the Iraqi government lacks much of a say in the matter because it does not have that much room for maneuver.

So we can say this much: Nothing has happened yet, but the Iranians have repositioned themselves as favoring some sort of diplomatic initiative from their side and the Americans so far have not done anything to discourage them.

US-Iranian negotiations are always opaque because they are ideologically difficult to justify by both sides. For Iran, the US is the Great Satan. For the US, Iran is part of the Axis of Evil. It is difficult for Iran to talk to the devil or for the US to negotiate with evil.

Therefore, US-Iranian discussions always take place in a strange way. The public rhetoric between the countries is always poisonous. If you simply looked at what each country says about the other, you would assume that no discussions are possible.

But if you treat the public rhetoric as simply designed to manage domestic public opinion, and then note the shifts in policy outside of the rhetorical context, a more complex picture emerges. Public and private talks have taken place, and more are planned. If you go beyond the talks to actions, things become even more interesting.

It is important to understand the strategic interests of the two countries at this point to understand what is going on. Ever since the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq has been the buffer between the Iranians and the Arabian Peninsula. The US expected to create a viable pro-American government quickly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and therefore expected that Iraq would continue to serve as a buffer. That did not happen for a number of reasons, and therefore the strategic situation has evolved.

The primary American interest in Iraq at this point is a negative one — namely, that Iraq not become an Iranian satellite. If that were to happen and Iranian forces entered Iraq, the entire balance of power in the Arabian Peninsula would collapse. Whatever the future of Iraq, US policy since the surge and before has been to prevent a vacuum into which Iran can move.

The primary Iranian interest in Iraq also is negative. Tehran must make sure that no Iraqi government is formed that is dominated by Sunnis, as happened under the Baathists, and that the Iraqi military never becomes powerful enough to represent an offensive threat to Iran. In other words, above all else, Iran’s interest is to avoid a repeat of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.

Through the surge, the US has demonstrated to the Iranians that it is not withdrawing from Iraq, and the Iranians do not have the ability to force an American withdrawal. So long as the Americans are there and moving closer to the Sunnis, the Iranians cannot achieve their positive goals and also must harbor concerns about the long-term future of Iraq. Each side has blocked the other’s strategic positive goal. Each side now wants to nail down its respective negative goal: avoiding the thing it fears the most.

Ever since the 2006 US congressional midterm elections, when President George W. Bush confounded Iranian expectations by actually increasing forces in Iraq rather than beginning a phased withdrawal, the two countries have been going through a complex process of talks and negotiations designed to achieve their negative ends: the creation of an Iraq that cannot threaten Iran but can be a buffer against Iranian expansion.

Neither side trusts the other, and each would love to take advantage of the situation to achieve its own more ambitious goals. But the reality on the ground is that each side would be happy if it avoided the worst-case scenario.
Again, ignoring the rhetoric, there has been a fairly clear sequence of events. Casualties in Iraq have declined — not only US military casualties but also civilian casualties. The civil war between Sunni and Shia has declined dramatically, although it did not disappear. Sunnis and Shia both were able to actively project force into more distant areas, so the decline did not simply take place because neighborhoods became more homogeneous, nor did it take place because of the addition of 30,000 troops.

Though the US created a psychological shift, even if it uses its troops more effectively, Washington cannot impose its will on the population. A change in tactics or an increase of troops to 150,000 cannot control a country of 25 million bent on civil war.

The decline in intracommunal violence is attributable to two facts. The first is the alliance between the US and Sunni leaders against al Qaeda, which limited the jihadists’ ability to strike at the Shia. The second is the decision by the Iranians to control the actions of Iranian-dominated militias. The return of Muqtada al-Sadr — the most radical of the Shiite leaders — to ayatollah school and his decision to order his followers to cease fire dramatically reduced Shiite-on-Sunni violence.

That would not, and could not, have happened without Iranian concurrence. If the Iranians had wanted the civil war to continue unabated, it would have. The Iranians cannot eliminate all violence, nor do they want to. They want the Americans to understand that they can resume the violence at will. Nevertheless, without the Iranian decision to limit the violence, the surge would not have worked.

If the prime Iranian threat against the US was civil war in Iraq, the prime American threat against Iran was an air campaign against Iranian infrastructure. Such a campaign was publicly justified by the US claim that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. With the Iranians having removed the threat of overwhelming civil war in Iraq, the United States responded by removing the threat of an air campaign.

The publication of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stating that Iran does not have a nuclear program at present effectively signaled the Iranians that there would be no campaign.

There was intense speculation that the NIE was a “coup” by the intelligence community against the president. Though an interesting theory, not a single author of the NIE has been fired, none of the intelligence community leaders has been removed, and the president has very comfortably lived with the report’s findings. He has lowered the threat of war against Iran while holding open the possibility — as the NIE suggests — that the Iranians might still be a threat, and that a new NIE might require airstrikes.

The Iranians reduced Shiite violence. The US reduced the threat of airstrikes. At various points, each side has tested and signaled to the other. The Iranians have encouraged small-scale attacks by Shia in recent weeks, but nothing like what was going on a year or two ago. During Bush’s trip to the region, the US triggered a crisis in the Strait of Hormuz to signal the Iranians that the US retains its options. The rhetoric remains apocalyptic, but the reality is that, without admitting it, each side has moved to lower the temperature.

Clearly, secret negotiations are under way. The announcement that an agreement was reached on the structure and subject of a public meeting this week by definition means that unpublicized conversations have been taking place. Similarly, the announcement that Ahmadinejad will be visiting Iraq could not have come without extensive back-channel discussions. We would suspect that these discussions actually have been quite substantial.

The Iranians have made clear what they want in these negotiations. Mottaki was quoted in the Iranian media as saying, “We did express our readiness for entering into negotiations with the US when the talks were held by the five Security Council permanent members plus Germany over Iran’s nuclear program.”

He also said that, “Revising its policies toward Iran, the US can pave the way for us to consider the circumstances needed for such talks to be held.” Since talks are being held, it must indicate some movement on the American part.

It all comes down to this: The US, at the very least, wants a coalition government in Iraq not controlled by Iran, which can govern Iraq and allow the US to draw down its forces. The Iranians want an Iraqi government not controlled by the US or the Sunnis, which can control Iraq but not be strong enough to threaten Iran. Iran also wants the US to end sanctions against Iran, while the US wants Iran to end all aspects of its nuclear program.

Ending sanctions is politically difficult for the US. Ending all aspects of the nuclear program is difficult for Iran. The US can finesse the sanctions issue by turning a blind eye to third powers trading with Iran and allowing US companies to set up foreign subsidiaries to conduct trade with Iran. The Iranians can finesse the nuclear issue, maintaining limited aspects of the program but not pursuing all the technologies needed to build a weapon.

Rhetoric aside, we are therefore in a phase where there are ways for each side to get what it wants. Obviously, the political process is under way in both countries, with Iranian parliamentary elections on March 14 and the US presidential race in full swing. Much domestic opposition is building up against Ahmadinejad, and an intensifying power struggle in Iran could be a fairly large distraction for the country in the short term.

The Iranians also could wait a bit more to see how the US presidential campaign shapes up before making any major decisions.

But then, a political process is always under way. That means the rhetoric will remain torrid; the public meetings few and low-key; the private discussions ongoing; and actions by each side sometimes inexplicable, keyed as they are to private discussions.

But it is clear from this week’s announcements by the Iranians that there is movement under way. If the Iranian president does visit Iraq and the US makes no effort to block him, that will be the signal that some sort of accommodation has been reached. The US and Iran will not recognize each other and will continue to condemn and even threaten each other. But this is truly a case where their rhetoric does not begin to reflect the reality.

(EnergyAsia, February 14, Thursday) --- French technology solutions company Areva said it has been awarded contracts worth a total of 41 million euros by two major Indian utilities, National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) and Powergrid. (US$1=0.67 euro).

Areva will design engineer, manufacture and supply power transformers for the 3 x 500 MW Indira Ghandi Thermal Power Project in Jhajjar in Haryana state. This is reportedly the largest single order of power transformers in India and has been given mega power project status by the Indian government.

Karim Vissandjee, Areva’s Transmission and Distribution CFO, said: “Areva has always believed in a new India where energy is a driving force. We are proud to be a key partner in the enhancement of the country’s Power Transmission and Distribution Networks.”

The companies signed the contracts at the recent India-France Economic conference in New Delhi in the presence of French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Areva’s CEO Anne Lauvergeon.

(EnergyAsia, February 13, Wednesday) --- Singapore’s Courage Marine Group Ltd, a dry bulk shipper of coal and iron ore, said it has been awarded an urgent contract to transport coal from Indonesia’s Kalimantan province to Guangzhou in China, which has been hit by weeks of severe snow storms. Courage Marine is deploying two handysize over the next two weeks to fulfil the contract.

China, which relies on coal for 78% of its power, is stepping up efforts to restore power supplies to regions hit by the worst snowstorm in more than five decades.

(EnergyAsia, February 11, Monday) --- Abu Dhabi has begun construction of its ambitious $22 billion Masdar City, proclaimed as the world’s first zero-carbon, zero-waste, car-free city. The global milestone event was marked by the laying of a virtual cornerstone and followed a visually stunning production depicting life in the city.

In conjunction with the groundbreaking, Masdar CEO Sultan Al Jaber announced a total development budget for the city of $22 billion, including $4 billion for the city’s infrastructure.